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Abstract  
This article explores how aesthetic gestures, experiences, interventions might help us 
make visible certain problematic, enduring, and historically contingent aspects of the 
troubling ways of being in which we, modern/Cartesian subjects exist in the world. The 
article does not seek to ultimately suggest some pedagogical strategies or approaches 
that will help us deconstruct/dismantle these problematic aspects. Instead, it proposes 
that the common way in which we imagine solutions to our problems, is the very way, 
through which these problems are being created in the first place. The text pays particular 
attention to two problematic constitutive characteristics of the modern/Cartesian subject. 
First is the reductivist insistence on having our being reduced to knowing (Andreotti, 
2016) that results in having our relationship to the world mediated (exclusively) through 
knowledge. Second is our insistence on being able to see/sense/experience ourselves only 
as separate, presumably autonomous, individuals that ultimately ends up producing us 
as such..  
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Introduction 
In order to make the arguments, presented in this article, somewhat easier to digest – 
though their taste might still remain bitter, I wish to begin by laying bare some of the 
basic assumptions that guide my work. I hope that in doing so, I can make explicit why I 
do not believe that the kinds of (institutionalized) education/schooling and educational 
research that dominate the field today can help us engage in particularly 
meaningful/sensible/useful ways with the challenges of multifaceted forms of systemic, 
historically inherited violences and injustices that we incur not just on each other, but also 
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at the world at large. That we are pedagogically and existentially seriously ill-equipped 
to deal with our own (collective) shadow may be considered my first assumption.  
Such disparate indicators as climate change denial (Norgaard, 2011), continuous 
over-depletion of natural resources (Meadows & Randers, 2012), accelerated human-
induced extinction of species (Dirzo, Young, Galetti, Ceballos, Isaac & Collen, 2014), 
increasing levels of narcissism and individualism (Kernberg, 1985; Lasch, 1991), rising 
nationalism, ethno-centrism and popular elections of post-truth leaders across the globe 
(Peters, 2018) suggest that, if anything, we seem to be getting worse at it. The levels of 
destruction and violence that we – humans as a species in general, and the Western(ized) 
world in particular, have incurred on each other and the planet in the 20th century 
(perhaps the last we were able to observe in whole) are unprecedented in our history. 
There seems to be very little, if any, evidence to suggest that a reverse trend may be 
emerging.  
My second assumption is that one of the main reasons for our incapacity to deal with 
the (self)destructive side of our behaviour lies predominantly not in a lack of knowledge 
and understanding, but in our unwillingness to do so. There are of course always some 
inevitable skeletons in the closet, but at least in general, we are already well aware of the 
vast range of harmful behaviour and harmful desires that we exhibit and inhabit. 
My third assumption is that because we are trying to live up to the idealized standards 
of humanity, we are also trying to live up to an idealized standard of our selves. In so 
doing, we deploy a broad range of (discursive) strategies that protect our idealized-self-
image and guard us against facing ‘difficult knowledge’ (Britzman, 1998). Thus, in my 
opinion, one the main pedagogical challenges of this moment in time (provided that time 
is linear) is not how we can learn more, but how to bypass, trick, interrupt and otherwise 
disrupt the defensive mechanisms that we have built around ourselves that prevent us 
from sensing ourselves as what we are – (human) beings of this world. 
In this article I explore how aesthetic gestures, experiences, interventions might help 
us to at least encounter certain aspects of our (collective) shadow and the defences that 
we have set-up to protect it. The idea here is not to ultimately suggest some kind of 
pedagogical strategies or approaches that will make us “better people”. Instead, I propose 
that the common way in which we imagine solutions to our problems is the very way 
through which these problems are being created in the first place. In this, I pay particular 
attention to two problematic constitutive characteristics of the modern/Cartesian subject: 
the reductivist insistence on having our being reduced to knowing (Andreotti, 2016) that 
results in having our relationship to the world mediated (exclusively) through knowledge; 
and, our insistence on being able to see/sense/experience ourselves only as separate, 
presumably autonomous, individuals. As these two traits seem to exert such an extremely 
powerful and restrictive grip on the ways we can see and sense ourselves, I deploy the 
notion of “thin hope” in the transformative and interruptive potential of aesthetic gestures, 
experiences and interventions. By thin hope I mean hope that lies not in our deliberate or 
wilful capacity to change ourselves, but rather in the power of that which exceeds (and at 
the same time inhabits) ourselves to intervene in ways that change us at the core of our 
being in spite of our conscious and unconscious refusal to do so. This resonates with 
Caputo’s (2013) ‘weak theology of perhaps’ that places hope not in what is (present and 
known), but in the radical opening of the unknown, the unknowable and the yet to come.      
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The aesthetic of the not necessarily beautiful 
The plural meanings, appropriateness and usefulness of the term “aesthetic” have been 
subject to long-standing and heated debates in various fields of arts, humanities and social 
sciences. A majority of these debates have converged around the deconstructivist, 
postmodernist turn that challenges modernist, universalist notions of aesthetics (and 
beauty) and instead proposes that our notions of the aesthetic are always already socially, 
culturally, politically and historically situated (Bourdieu, 1987; Eagleton, 1990; Foster, 
1983; Shusterman, 1997). Critical scholars in arts education, such as Tavin (2007), have 
argued that the discourse of ‘aesthetic experience in art education serves specific social 
and political interests while simultaneously masking those experiences’ (Tavin, 2007, p. 
43). For Tavin, our discourse of aesthetics today is still irrevocably tied to the 
development of 18th century modern, autonomous, self-determining bourgeois subject 
that is the only kind of subject that is perceived as being fully human. This subject’s full 
humanity is realized through an embodiment of culturally specific, socialized forms of 
appreciation, in other words the modern subject is seen as capable of experiencing the 
world aesthetically. Far from being a neutral term, the aesthetic is thus seen as 
ideologically, politically and historically laden with modernist, enlightenment-based 
hierarchies of value and worth that – at least for Tavin (2007), remain ‘indelible’ (Tavin, 
2007, p. 43) despite the ‘ad nauseam’ attempts at ‘critique and redevelopment of 
aesthetics’ (Tavin, 2007, p. 43). Somewhat expectedly, Tavin proposes that discourse of 
aesthetics should be replaced with a postmodern discourse of representation that makes 
visible the inevitable political and historical contingency of aesthetics. While I certainly 
agree with the need for a deconstruction of any presumably universal signifiers, such as 
aesthetics, in this article I wish to propose a different engagement with the aesthetic that 
does not necessarily map onto either side of modern/postmodern debate. Rather than 
being interested in the aesthetic content, I try to explore the performative and educational 
potential of the aesthetic experience. I am thus not interested in what may or may not be 
considered aesthetic, but rather in what the aesthetic may (or may not) do. 
For this reason, I propose a rather “thin” or tentative conceptualization of the 
aesthetic merely as that (an object, a gesture, an experience) which holds a possibility 
(and an intention) to interrupt our normalized expectations and codifications about the 
world and ourselves. An important aspect of this interruption is that it acts upon us 
involuntarily, pre-cognitively, and as such transforms – at least temporarily, the way we 
experience our being in the world. Such a notion of the aesthetic has little to do with 
questions of beauty, taste, or sensorial pleasure and their socio-cultural or political 
constructions, but more with questions related to the boundaries of our perceptive, 
cognitive, imaginative, affective and relational capabilities that we have been socialized 
into (Andreotti, 2016). More specifically, I am interested in exploring how an aesthetic 
engagement or an aesthetic experience might help us discover and map these boundaries 
and what lies beyond the limits of what we would usually consider desirable, intelligible, 
relevant, true, and ultimately, possible. As such the aesthetic does not need to be related 
to any particular notion of beauty, nor does it have to involve an inquiry into any given 
art-piece. However, this criterion does ask of it to open a crack in the ways we see and 
sense ourselves in the world. In that sense a particular work of art might serve as the 
necessary stimulus for the interruption of our normalized modes of thinking, sensing and 
being (see, for example, Todd (2015) on the work of Abramović), however, in this 
conceptualization the aesthetic is not necessarily art-bound, or art-related, though it may 
be so. 
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This notion of the aesthetic resonates with (but also goes beyond) Kompridis’s (2014) 
and Rancière’s (2004) proposition that the aesthetic is that which is responsible for the 
‘distribution or partition of the “sensible” – what is given to sense to make sense of, but 
also what already makes sense, what appears as already (unquestionably) intelligible’ 
(Kompridis, 2014, p. xvii). As Rancière (2004, 2010) in his works focuses predominantly 
on the role of the aesthetic in the political realm, I do not engage with his work in this 
text directly, as I am more interested in exploring the existential (rather than primordially 
political) openings/transformations that can be provoked through aesthetic interventions, 
for which Kompridis’s (2013) analysis of the metafictional novel The Lives of Animals 
provides a much better starting ground. Still, much like Rancière, Kompridis (2014) 
elsewhere seems primarily interested in how by re-thinking the aesthetic we may expand 
the realm of what is possible in the political sphere: ‘each time modern theorists run up 
against the limits of extant modes of thinking about the possibilities of political life and 
the impediments to their realization, they turn to the aesthetic’ Kompridis, 2014, p. xvi). 
In this I read Kompridis (and Rancière) as suggesting a problematic theory of change that 
proposes an expansion of what is considered sensible/thinkable that would in turn lead to 
an expansion of political possibilities that could then lead to an expansion of ontological 
possibilities – a change in ways of being. This reflects a common understanding of how 
change is enacted, especially in education, where more and better (critical) knowledge is 
usually considered necessary (and sufficient) for inducing a change in attitudes, 
dispositions and behaviour that would in turn translate to more profound personal (and 
social) transformation (Andreotti, Stein, Sutherland, Pashby, Suša & Amsler, 2018). Such 
a conceptualization of change takes little or no account of unconscious projections, 
attachments and addictions that prevent us from disinvesting from (harmful) undesirable 
desires.  
 
Thinking, being and struggling with insistence on intelligibility 
Although Kompridis makes use of the aesthetic mostly as a tool for expansion of 
thinkable/political possibilities that converge broadly along the lines of a 
Hegelian/Arendtian goal of politics as a tool for achieving ‘freedom of subjectivity […] 
freedom to change how things are, to change ourselves by changing the circumstances in 
which we find ourselves – a change in conditions of possibility and intelligibility’ 
(Kompridis, 2014, xiv), he does offer examples of how the aesthetic can be also used to 
expand different kinds of existential/ontological possibilities that are not necessarily 
grounded in a primary need for expanded knowledge. This is arguably most visible in his 
analysis (Kompridis, 2013) of the role of the fictional character Elizabeth Costello from 
J. M. Coetzee’s (1999) metafictional novel The Lives of Animals that is ‘calling on us to 
become receptive to what we have heretofore been unreceptive’, which means ‘becoming 
answerable to a call to change our lives’ (Kompridis, 2014, xxx).1 In this novel the 
character Costello is grappling with an existential problem of how to continue living 
(well) in face of the omnipresent violence and suffering that humans inflicts upon animals 
(and other humans), a violence that seems to go unnoticed or is brushed aside by a vast 
majority of people. Her capacity to see, coupled with her incapacity to turn away, to 
pretend not to see, is pushing her into an existential crisis, where she begins to doubt her 
sanity and where those around her cannot relate to her concerns.  
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It’s that I no longer know where I am. I seem to move around perfectly easily among people, 
to have perfectly normal relations with them. Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of them 
are participants in a crime of stupefying proportions? Am I fantasizing it all? I must be 
mad! Yet every day I see the evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, 
exhibit it, offer it to me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses that they have bought for money. 
[…] Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out of a molehill. This is life. 
Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t you? Why can’t you? (Coetzee, 1999/2016, 
p. 69).   
Kompridis (2013) argues that Costello finds it impossible to make herself intelligible to 
others in ways that would unsettle this normalization of violence that she can now longer 
turn away from, can no longer remain ‘wilfully ignorant’ (Tuana, 2006, p.11) about. In 
some ways the example of Costello’s struggle can be used to discuss the many layers of 
complexity and the multiple paradoxes involved in trying to speak across onto-epistemic 
divides, but she tries to do so using the language and grammar of the same onto-
epistemology that she is trying to deconstruct. She tries to make herself heard and 
acknowledged, to have what she sees validated also by others, but the language (of 
philosophical argumentation and academic discourse) betrays her, her propositions being 
ridiculed and dismissed by others as ramblings of an old woman. What deepens her crisis 
is that she is seemingly caught between two equally terrifying propositions – either she is 
right (and the world is mad), or the world is right (and she is mad). Not being able to 
imagine beyond such dichotomies and not being able to maintain calmness in inhabiting 
a paradoxical position, she is desperate for some sort of external validation, she needs to 
know how things are. And again, it is precisely Costello’s focus on knowledge/thinking 
that is the source of so much of her frustration, although she intuitively, perhaps 
unconsciously gestures towards the problem. The following excerpt from Coetzee 
(1999/2016), used also by Kompridis (2013) in his analysis, can hopefully help illustrate 
the problem somewhat clearer:  
The particular horror of the death camps, the horror that convinces us that what went on 
there was a crime against humanity, is not that despite a humanity shared with their victims, 
the killers treated them like lice. That is too abstract. The horror is that the killers refused 
to think themselves into the place of their victims, as did everyone else. They said, ‘It is 
they in those cattle-cars rattling past.’ They did not say, ‘How would it be if it were I in that 
cattle-car? They did not say, ‘It is I who am in that cattle-car?’ They said, ‘It must be the 
dead who are being burnt today, making the air stink and falling in ash on my cabbages.’ 
They did not say, ‘How would it be if I were burning?’ They did not say, ‘I am burning. I 
am falling in ash.’ In other words, they closed their hearts. (Coetzee, 1999/2016, p. 34, 
italics added)   
When Costello suggests that the guards in the death camps ‘refused to think themselves 
into the place of their victims’ (ibid.) and when she emphasizes what they said, or did not 
say (rather than what the felt/sensed/embodied), her words resonate with the Cartesian 
maxim of being reduced to knowing (I think therefore I am) and its accompanying 
logocentric fantasy (I say therefore it is) (Ahenakew, 2016; Andreotti, 2016; Mika, 
Andreotti, Cooper, Ahenakew & Silva, forthcoming). However, what she proposes that 
the guards should say – ‘It is I who am in that cattle-car. […] I am burning. I am falling 
in ash.’ (Coetzee, 1999/2016, p. 34), does seem to gesture towards a possibility of a 
different way of imagining one’s self or being. One that is not (completely) bound by the 
notion of separability that together with sequentiality and determinacy represents one of 
the three ontological pillars of Enlightenment-based modern world (Silva, 2016). In other 
words, it sounds as if Costello is aware of the need to move beyond the notion of the 
body-encapsulated-self, but proposes that we can think ourselves into a different way of 
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being, rather than exploring (also) the more humbling notion of a need to be changed (by 
the world) in our way of being first, since we, the presumed autonomous individuals, are 
seemingly neither willing nor capable of letting go of our insistence on separability. To 
be pushed towards ‘being otherwise’ (Andreotti, 2016) by whatever (externally inflicted) 
crisis or existential interruption seems to be a much more realistic expectation (and even 
that is a highly contentious one) than waiting for us to be willing to change ourselves. 
Only once we are forced to exist in the world differently, only in extreme situations, when 
insistence on separability is no longer an option, might we (perhaps) be able also to think 
(and act) differently. I can, however, provide no guarantee nor proof that this is possible 
in any conventional sense of the word.  
To those of us that have been socialized in the modern/Cartesian mode of being 
reduced to knowing (Andreotti, 2016; Mika, 2012; Mika et al., forthcoming) it may be 
very difficult (perhaps impossible) to imagine how a different way of being may be 
invoked, without (unconsciously) attempting to think/plan/project/imagine our way 
towards it. Namely, there is an (insurmountable) ontological difference between merely, 
hypothetically, imagining ‘How would it be if I were burning?’ and actually sensing 
another person’s pain (of being burned). We may not be able to imagine what that might 
feel like, because we have been socialized away from inhabiting such sensibilities, or 
even away from allowing to entertain the possibility of such sensibilities to exist, but 
would embodying such a sensibility not lead to a profoundly different disposition toward 
the pain of others? Towards the pain that we ourselves are inflicting? Again, such an 
ontological shift may not be possible, and certainly is not possible within the framework 
of what we usually consider to be available roster of existential possibilities. However, 
there is always the option of more being available than what we can imagine, and, 
consequentially, allow to exist in our limited construction of what the world is.  
Very helpful in extending the range of what we usually consider possible, is Mika et 
al. (forthcoming) article The ontological differences between wording and worlding the 
world. In this paper, the authors propose a distinction between two onto-metaphysical 
orientations: ‘one that reduces being to discursive practices, which [they] call “wording 
the world”; and another that manifests being as co-constitutive of a worlded world, where 
language is one amongst other inter-woven entities, which [they] call “worlding the 
world”’ (Mika et al, forthcoming, p. 1). The first draws its lineage from the long roots of 
the modern/colonial grammar that can be traced at least as far as Plato and his contention 
that it is ‘through the permanence of the Form that things attain their identity’ (Mika et 
al., forthcoming, p. 6). Mika et al. refer to this as ‘metaphysics of presence’ where ‘the 
world is experienced by humans as if it is fragmented and atomistic, and where each thing 
in the world is perceived as highly evident and possessing static characteristics’ (ibid., 
italics added). Within this onto-metaphysical orientation, ‘language is mobilized in 
service to this fixity; it is used to describe and represent with truth the nature of things in 
the world’ (ibid.). Language is thus mobilized to lock-down existential possibilities, even 
in attempts that attempt to deconstruct dominant forms of representation and replace them 
with marginalized ones. Only that, which is languageable, and therefore 
thinkable/intelligible, is allowed to exist.  
Thus, unlike what is assumed by most theories of the Post (post-modern, post-
colonial, post-structuralist), we can neither think, talk nor deconstruct our way out of this 
onto-metaphysical entrapment, because its totality sets the boundaries of legibility, 
intelligibility, relevance and existence. Sousa Santos (2007) refers to this problematic 
mode of modern Western thinking-cum-existing as ‘abyssal thinking’ that:  
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consists of a system of visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the 
foundation of the visible ones. The division is such that ‘the other side of the line’ vanishes 
as reality becomes non-existent, and is indeed produced as non-existent. [...] What most 
fundamentally characterizes abyssal thinking is thus the impossibility of the co-presence of 
the two sides of the line. To the extent that it prevails, this side of the line only prevails by 
exhausting the field of relevant reality. Beyond it, there is only non-existence, invisibility, 
non−dialectical absence (Sousa Santos, 2007, p. 45). 
In other words, the metaphysics of presence requires an erasure of that which is absent 
for itself to remain present, to continue existing. Similarly to Santos, Ahenakew (2016) 
argues that we cannot (perhaps should not) make the absent/invisible into present/visible 
(as that would re-trap the absent in the metaphysics of presence and produce other kinds 
of erasure), but we can make the absent ‘noticeably absent so that it can be remembered 
and missed’ (Santos, Ahenakew, 2016, p. 333).  
In contrast to metaphysics of presence, to ‘wording the world’, Mika et al. 
(forthcoming) position the onto-metaphysical orientation of ‘worlding the world’, based 
on Maori philosophy of language ‘that is and expresses the worlding of the world’ (Mika 
et al. forthcoming, p. 9, italics added). They use Te reo Māori (the Maori language) as an 
example of a language that, in spite of being grafted into non-Indigenous institutions 
(Ahenakew, 2016) and having suffered by translations into the metaphysics of presence 
(as the only legible option in academia), still ‘overwhelmingly reveals the complex and 
interrelated nature of all things within and beyond perception’ (Mika et al., forthcoming, 
p. 9). In Maori language, the language itself is a manifestation of the entanglement of all 
“things” visible and invisible, of fullness and emptiness, and that is in stark contrast with 
the Western/modern notion of separability. As such language is seen as having (living) 
agency, like everything else, it is not merely a “human invention”, but is co-constituted 
and constitutive of both humans and everything else in the world.  
I can only speculate through rare glimpses in the cracks what an embodiment of such 
an entangled relationship with everything might feel like as a lived experience, what it 
might be like to inhabit a world that is alive in its totality, what it might be like not to be 
an “I” in the sense that is familiar to me, and where what I would consider “me” is also 
somehow within everything else. The little of what does seem clear, is that this really 
does require what Denise Silva (2016) calls ‘the end of the world as we know it’ (Silva 
2016, p. 58), or rather the end of the way in which we were taught to know (and relate to) 
the world. I wonder what kind of other profoundly disturbing realizations such a way of 
being might entail. I wonder, how disturbed Costello would be, if she sensed and felt the 
full extent of the depth of the cut that we have created between ourselves and the world. 
Would she be able to bear it? Would she still believe that we have lost our humanity or 
would she maybe feel that humanity is not necessarily something that we should hold in 
very high esteem? Given that we came here last and left such a horrific imprint, perhaps 
it is time to for us reconsider what it means/is to be human and what kind of attributes we 
usually associate with humanity. 
 
Shuddering and de-idealizing humanity 
It seems fair to assume that any attempt at interrupting our normalized ways of being in 
the world, of disturbing our carefully crafted innocent self-image(s), of uncovering 
harmful desires that we know we have and those we do not even know we do, is bound 
to shake us up. It is hardly surprising that engaging with such ‘difficult knowledge’ 
(Britzman, 1998) is something we would in general prefer not to do. Here is where an 
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aesthetic experience/intervention might be of help. It might be of help, because it can 
catch us “off guard”, it can provoke us into surfacing that within us that we would prefer 
to keep stored away. In this part of the paper I use the example of Sharon Todd’s (2015) 
discussion of Marina Abramović’s (in)famous performance Rhythm 0 to explore both the 
potential and the risks involved in such interventions.  
I begin, however, by drawing on Gert Biesta’s (2015) suggestion that education 
should be about opening ourselves towards ‘being taught’ (Biesta, 2015, p. 53) by the 
world, a process that is very different from merely ‘learning from’ (Biesta, 2015, p. 53) 
the world. Biesta proposes that the main difference between these two approaches is that 
in learning from the world the learners remain in control of the learning process, they can 
choose what they will or will not learn by bringing what they learn ‘within their own 
circle of understanding, within their own construction’ (Biesta, 2015, p. 53), while in the 
process of being taught, they have no such choice. In contrast to ‘learning from’ the 
process of ‘being taught by’ is considerably more challenging as it interrupts/violates the 
perceived entitlement to autonomy/separability of the subject. Such an experience is not 
necessarily (or at all) pleasant, but it can be profoundly transformative. As Biesta (2015) 
says, when we talk of:  
experiences that really taught [us] something—we more often than not refer to experiences 
where someone showed us something or made us realize something that really entered our 
being from the outside. Such teachings often provide insights about ourselves and our ways 
of doing and being—insights that we were not aware of or rather did not want to be aware 
of. They are inconvenient truths or, in the words of Deborah Britzman, cases of ‘difficult 
knowledge’ (Biesta, 2015, p. 53).     
These inconvenient truths about ourselves and the ways we relate to each other and to the 
world could be considered alongside Kompridis’s (2013) proposition that we should work 
on addressing our ‘failures of receptivity’ (Kompridis, 2013, p. 20), our failed attempts at 
answering the other’s need for acknowledgment, particularly when we should respond to 
something that is voiced in unfamiliar way – that is in ways that disturb how perceive 
ourselves and the world around us. Thus, rather than facing the full complexity of what it 
means being part of the world, to assume responsibility for being of this world and for all 
inevitable messiness of the human and more-than-human relations, we often choose to 
turn away from such difficult teachings. Unwilling to face that which we cannot control 
and that which we do not want to (rather than simply cannot) see and feel, we retreat 
within the comfortable boundaries of the already known, already felt, already sensed, 
already lived. 
Todd (2015) writes of this unwillingness to face ourselves and our shadow as 
‘avoidance of shuddering’ (Todd, 2015, p. 53). Drawing on the work of Martin Buber 
(1923/1958), Todd (2015) suggests that the discomfort and dis-ease that we experience 
‘as beings who are both part of the world and yet who seem to experience the world as 
separate’ (Todd, 2015, p. 53), ‘the sheer sense of being overwhelmed in facing the extent 
of our entanglements with others and with the enormity of our task within a world that 
seems so outside the frames of our own bodies and thoughts’ (Todd, 2015, p. 53) makes 
us shudder at the depth of perceived alienation that we experience between ourselves (or 
what we call our self(s) and the world). In other words, for Todd, the avoidance of 
shuddering refers to our unwillingness to deal with the fears, despair and sheer 
overwhelmingness of realizing that we are part of the world. The enormity of the task of 
facing the world (and ourselves in it) as it is – here and now, makes us persevere in our 
denial of accepting the responsibility for the ‘enmeshment of self with world’ (Todd, 
2015, p. 54), makes us persevere in our upkeep of ‘illusions of […] separateness and 
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isolation of our existence’ (ibid.). Rather than facing the implications of what it actually 
means to be part of the world, we might instead choose to ‘convince ourselves that the 
world cannot affect me, so separate am I from it, or that I cannot affect the world since it 
is only my existence that matters. These various responses seem to suffice until one day, 
as Buber suggests, they don’t[.]’ (Todd, 2015, p. 54).  
According to Todd (2015), our constitutive denial of the fact of our embeddedness 
in the world helps us shift our attention away from living in the present and instead orients 
us towards ‘living our dreams of the future’ (p. 54). In relation to education, this means 
that ‘education operates within a constructed ideal of humanity defined in relation to the 
culture and society of which it is part’ (ibid.). In contemporary Western societies this 
ideal of humanity is exemplified by the image of the white, male, liberal, rational, 
compassionate, tolerant, benevolent, modern subject (Wynter, 2003). In order for this 
idealization to be maintained, for the socializing function of education ‘which is always 
dependent upon a future-oriented outlook’ (p. 55) to continue through various forms of 
institutionalized schooling, certain less salutary facets of humanity have to denied as 
inhuman(e), ignored or seen as pertaining (exclusively) to the societies of Others – those 
deemed not fully human (Bhabha, 1994). Our languages (though perhaps not all of them) 
overwhelmingly associate the Western, Enlightenment-based notion of humanity and 
human(e) behaviour with exclusively positive attributes, contributing to the upkeep of the 
idealized fantasy of what it means to be human(e). The following excerpt from the 
Merriam Webster dictionary (n. d.) may serve as an example: 
 
Definition of humane  
1: marked by compassion, sympathy, or consideration for humans or animals 
humane prison guards a more humane way of treating farm animals 
2: characterized by or tending to broad humanistic culture: humanistic humane 
studies 
 
Synonyms 
beneficent, benevolent, benignant, compassionate, good-hearted, kind, kindhearted, 
kindly, softhearted, sympathetic, tender, tenderhearted, warmhearted 
 
Antonyms 
atrocious, barbaric, barbarous, bestial, brutal, brute, brutish, callous, cold-blooded, 
cruel, fiendish, hard-hearted, heartless, inhuman, inhumane, insensate, sadistic, savage, 
truculent, uncompassionate, unfeeling, unkind, unkindly, unsympathetic, vicious, wanton 
 
Although it may be considered inaccurate or even misleading to equate human with 
humane, I propose this intervention here with the purpose of making visible defensive 
responses that seek to protect the fantasy image of “good” humanity. As an example of 
how such protective mechanisms operate, one can observe that in this particular 
dictionary entry the antonym of humane is not merely inhumane, but also inhuman. 
Inhuman is joined by other telling words such barbaric, brute and savage that have a long 
and continuous history of being used as descriptors for various groups of racialized 
Others. Anger, rage, violence, hatred, viciousness etc. are apparently seen as affective 
states that have no place in a carefully manicured and idealized notion of humanity as 
(merely) good-, kind-, soft-, tender- and warm- hearted. This primordial dismissal of 
violence (in its various forms) as essentially inhuman, lies at the heart of our (collective) 
unwillingness and incapacity to face-up to the whole of what we are and of what we will 
consequentially continue to be. As Todd (2015) argues via Levinas (1974/1998), it is only 
 [194]  Rene Susa 
 
by facing the humanness of violence that we can admit the very possibility of nonviolence 
into our lives. When theorizing systemic violence, we often turn to historical examples of 
large-scale atrocities that were committed either in the name of particular (radicalized) 
political ideologies, religious stances, or charismatic influence of genocidal leaders(hip). 
While such analyses provide extremely important insights into how different forms of 
(gender, racial, religious, sexual, ableist)  violence get (re)produced through socially, 
culturally, legally and politically sanctioned mechanisms, the emphasis on systemic 
analysis may prevent us from also considering how we ourselves are implicated in the 
continuation of these different forms of violence – explicitly and implicitly and how we 
all hold the potential to bring out the worst of what humanity can do.  
Experiments in social psychology, such as Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford prison 
experiment (Zimbardo, 2011), the Milgram Yale experiments (Milgram, 1974/2009, see 
also Doliński, Grzyb, Folwarczny, Grzybała, Krzyszycha, Martynowska & Trojanowski, 
2017) and artistic interventions, such as Marina Abramović’s Rhythm 0 (Abramović, 
Vettese, Di Pietrantonio, Daneri, Hegvi & Sanzio, 2009; Todd, 2015), clearly 
demonstrate that, under certain conditions, “normal” people can quickly resort to acts of 
unimaginable violence. Unlike Zimbardo’s and Milgram’s experiments where 
participants were specifically instructed to assume roles of punitive figures (prison 
guards, electric shock administrators), Abramović gave no instructions to the visitors of 
her Rhytm 0 performance. She simply stood, fully clothed in the Neapolitan gallery for a 
period of six hours. The room in which she stood contained a table that held seventy-two 
objects including a flower, feather boa, knife, razor and loaded pistol. (Todd, 2015, p. 
56). ‘The idea was how far you can be vulnerable and how far the public can go and do 
things with you, on your own body’ (Abramović et al. 2009, in Todd, 2015, p. 56). 
Although the first few hours passed relatively peacefully, unprovoked violence towards 
Abramović began to emerge and escalate quickly. By the end of the performance, 
Abramović’s clothes were cut off with razors, water was spilled onto her, she was stabbed 
with thorns and cut, various acts of sexual violation were performed on her and a gun was 
pointed at her head. The experiment in vulnerability and humility ended in violence and 
hostility. As Abramović (in Todd, 2015) puts it: ‘The experience I drew from this piece 
was that in your own performances you can go very far, but if you leave decisions to the 
public, you can be killed’ (p. 57). Todd (2015) sums up the pedagogical significance of 
what transpired during Rhythm 0 in the following lines: 
This piece should not be read as a cautionary tale of what happens when one shows one’s 
vulnerability (don’t be vulnerable, or else!); rather it reveals the complete unwillingness to 
face the rawness of violence as “human”. As a pedagogical space, what Abramović’s 
“experiment” shows is that the transformation of the self as a responsible subject can only 
come about by recognizing the dark sides of humanity as a beginning for creating change 
(Todd, 2015, p. 57). 
Abramović undertook considerable personal risk when she decided to mount this 
experiment, and it seems disrespectful to dismiss its teachings as merely a cautionary tale 
against showing vulnerability as Todd suggests, or as something that has no pedagogical 
value for “us” – the members of idealized humanity that could never do such a thing to 
someone else. The question here is not merely what kind of harm and violence are we all 
potentially capable of doing, but also what kind of harm and violence do we already 
participate in – yet refuse to acknowledge, examine or act upon.  
Lisa Taylor (2013) reports on her pedagogical experiments in engaging students in 
exploring their entanglements with the multiple forms of ongoing colonial violence, and 
offers an analysis of ‘psychic challenges involved in students’ adopting perspectives that 
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radically shift (neo)imperial relations of power/knowledge, that de-centre and implicate 
them in relation to the planetary South’ (p. 59). Similarly to Biesta, she employs 
Britzman’s (1998) notion of ‘difficult knowledge’ to explore what kind of strategies of 
resistance learners deploy to avoid facing up to difficult knowledge that interrupts the 
learner’s position of epistemic and ontological privilege. The surrender of this privilege 
is personally challenging, as it involves both an abandonment of the safety of inhabiting 
a known world and of a known self (Ellsworth, 2005, as cited in Taylor, 2013):  
 [i]n order to learn something new, as in previously unthought, we must lose that part of 
ourselves whose identity depends on not thinking that thought … that depends on not being 
the kind of person who entertains such thoughts or understands such thoughts (Ellsworth, 
2005, as cited in Taylor, 2013, p. 59).  
Ellsworth here suggests an inversion of the usual theory of change where a change in 
knowledge leads to a change in being. Instead she proposes that a change in being – ‘not 
being the kind of person who entertains such thoughts’ precedes a change in knowledge, 
or more precisely precedes the possibility of previously unthinkable and unimaginable to 
become thinkable and imaginable. Of course, this does not apply to all kinds of 
knowledge or thought processes – we can learn new things and think new thoughts that 
do not require any change in our way of being. However, as internally diverse as such 
knowledge and thinking may be, it is likely not going to be deeply, ontologically different 
from what we already know. It will merely be an addition of more of the same. It will not 
make us exist in the world differently, it will not change us in ways that make us ‘shudder’ 
(Todd, 2015). It is only when we let go of our assumptions and projections about who 
and what we are (of our self-image), and surrender the desire for the rewards that are 
accessed through those constructions, that we can begin to imagine, think and sense 
‘otherwise’ (Andreotti, 2016). 
 
Resistance to difficult knowledge as point of departure, rather than closure 
In her article Against the tide, Taylor (2013) suggests that instead of trying to repress or 
morally condemn resistance against facing difficult knowledge that implicates us in a 
widespread global matrix of violent, unjust, (neo)imperial / (neo)colonial power relations, 
we should instead consider resistance as an inevitable component, indeed an indicator of 
engagement with difficult knowledge. As such, resistance should not be considered as a 
point of closure, but as a point of departure. Further, Taylor (2013) identifies several ‘D’s 
of resistance: discursive strategies that learners deploy in order to avoid facing difficult 
knowledge. She lists denial, discreditation/ doubt, defensiveness, demand of attention, 
despair, distraction, domination, disconnection, conDemnation, distancing/ divestment/ 
detachment, deflection and personalization (Taylor, 2013, p. 62) as examples of such 
strategies. There is arguably a lot we can potentially learn about ourselves and our 
relations with others and the world, if we can take a step back and observe our resistance 
strategies from a distance, rather than simply embody them.2 However, in order for that 
to happen, we have to either allow or simply not have any other choice, but to let the 
world “teach us”. Biesta (2018) also writes of the importance of resistance in the process 
of being taught. For Biesta if we exist as subjects in the world this means that we 
invariably exist ‘in dialogue with the world’ (p. 15, italics original), our existence is not 
about ‘what we have – our skills, our competencies, the things we have gathered and 
learned – nor about who we are’ (Biesta, 2018, p. 15). Rather, it is about ‘what we do and 
about what we refrain from doing. It is […] not about who we are, but about how we are 
 [196]  Rene Susa 
 
or, more realistically, how we are trying to be’ (Biesta, 2018, p. 15). And, because the 
existence of others places restrictions on our desires, being a subject does not mean that 
we can simply do what we want to do. Thus, we are required to ‘try to exist in dialogue 
with what and who is other – in the world without occupying the centre of the world’ 
(Biesta, 2018, p. 15). As the existence of other compels us to de-centre, the encounter 
with the world is experienced as resistance against unbound fulfilment of our desires. 
Biesta’s use of resistance is different from the way Taylor (2013) uses the term. For 
Taylor it is the subject that deploys various strategies of resistance to safeguard 
themselves against facing difficult knowledge. For Biesta (2018) it is the world (or others) 
that offer resistance against the subject’s desires being met unconditionally (or at all). 
However, in both cases, resistance is pedagogically relevant because it points to different 
sets of boundaries. In Taylor’s example resistance points to the subject’s boundaries of 
what they are willing to learn/imagine, in Biesta’s case the world/others sets external 
boundaries on what we can legitimately will/desire. Biesta argues that the experience of 
dialogue – that is, an encounter with others, above all teaches us that the world is real and 
that in this world we ‘are not alone’ (p. 16, italics original). Upon realizing this, Biesta 
suggests that the subject essentially has three choices on how to respond to this 
realization.   
In the first scenario our frustrations against having our desires met push us ‘harder 
and harder to make our intentions and ambitions real’ (Biesta, 2018, p. 16), which runs 
the danger of disrespecting the integrity of the encounter. In the extreme, this can results 
in ‘the destruction of what we encounter, the destruction of what offers resistance. […] 
thus we end up in the destruction of the very world we seek to exist.’ (ibid.). Historically, 
various kinds of genocide may be considered as examples of extreme examples of 
destruction of what offers resistance. Moving away from the extremes we can argue that 
in more common educational settings, we can still witness more or less violent dismissal 
of what learners refuse to face (i.e. the limits to our-selves that the world is showing us) 
that can lead to verbal, physical or other kinds of attack against (often racialized) others, 
whose existence reminds of the fact that world is not ‘our construction’ (Biesta, 2018, p. 
16, italics original). Of Taylor’s resistance strategies denial, discreditation/doubt, 
defensiveness, demand of attention, domination, disconnection, conDemnation, 
deflection and personalization could be considered as broadly indicative of such a stance. 
The second option is for Biesta an inversion of the first. Overwhelmed by frustration 
of resistance, we resort to withdrawal from the world. ‘We abandon our initiatives and 
ambitions because we feel that is too difficult, not worth the effort, too frustrating, and so 
on, to pursue them’ (Biesta, 2018, p. 16). This seems to resonate deeply with Todd’s 
notion of avoidance of ‘shuddering’. Again, the list of Taylor’s resistance strategies can 
provide some examples of potential indicators of such a stance, such as despair, 
disconnection, distancing, divestment and detachment. 
The third option for Biesta is to try to stay away from these two extremes and try to 
exist as a subject in dialogue, where dialogue is not understood as conversation, but as an 
‘existential form, a way of existing in the world – not withdrawing from it – without 
putting ourselves in the centre of the world but leaving space for the world to exist as well 
– hence existing with the world’ (p. 16, italics original). For Biesta in this kind of a 
dialogue there is never a winner since ‘trying to exist in dialogue – is precisely where 
winning is not an option; it is rather and ongoing, lifelong challenge.  It is the challenge 
to exist with what and who is other; it is the challenge to exist as a subject in the world’ 
(ibid.), to ‘exist in a grown-up way’ (p. 17). By existing in a grown-up way Biesta means 
to exist in a way of being where we try to give an answer ‘to the question of which of our 
Struggling with the reccuring reduction of being to knowing    [197] 
 
desires are the desires we ought to have, which of our desires are desirable’ (p. 17, italics 
original).  
Resonating with Todd’s (2015) exploration of the transformative and educational 
potential of Abramović’s artistic performance for showing us how easily we can overstep 
the boundaries of idealized humanity, Biesta (2018) writes of the performative aspect of 
art, of ‘encountering the doing of art’ (p. 17), where art is seen as an ‘ongoing and never-
ending exploration of what it might mean to exist in and with the world’, ‘to be – here – 
now’, to explore ‘the encounter with what and who is other’ (ibid.). This brings us back 
to the initially proposed notion of the aesthetic as the experience of the interruption of our 
normalized codifications about the world and about our role in it. While not necessarily 
art-bound (as it is questionable what may or may not be considered art) an intervention 
of the aesthetic into our normalized existence can help us dislodge some of the 
assumptions and perhaps can help us work through some of our resistance against difficult 
knowledge.  
 
Still a long way from home 
Unfortunately, neither dislodging normalized assumptions and projections (including de-
idealizing humanity) as proposed by Todd, facing and overcoming discursive strategies 
of resistance against difficult knowledge (Taylor), or Biesta’s seeking of answers to the 
question of ‘which of our desires are desirable’ and perceiving art as ‘the never-ending 
exploration of what it might mean to exist in and with the world’ (italics added) is 
ultimately how an embodiment of a different way of being may come about. All of the 
listed propositions can help us have better, deeper discussions that can be very relevant, 
but they cannot make us feel/sense ourselves in (relation to) the world differently. I am 
also inclined to believe that the authors themselves might perhaps feel that way too. The 
same goes for this text. As Mika et al. (forthcoming) argue ‘our attempts to deconstruct 
[the modern grammar and its] tendencies are mostly futile because our own intelligibility 
is dependent on the grammar and the intellectual, affective and performative economies 
the grammar itself sustains and is sustained by’ (p. 7). Therefore, if this text is at least 
somewhat intelligible, it must have failed to engender anything that would be 
significantly onto-epistemically different.  
While my intention in writing it was not to propose that there is something specific 
that we can do about our current predicament, that there is something important and new 
that we need to know first and that this text might somehow show that “thing”, or that we 
can write in ways that really change something in the way we experience/inhabit our 
selves, it was nevertheless motivated by a desire to somehow make sense, rather than to 
sense sense of what is going on. Most likely, life will feel and be lived no differently 
before the first and after the last line of this text. Indeed, it would be too much to expect 
of a text anyhow.  
I do wonder, though, what happened for the visitors of Abramović’s performance, as 
that was an event with minimal or no verbal input. Was there something that changed for 
the visitors and for her too – at least for a few moments? Was it a glimpse of what it feels 
like to be completely vulnerable to each other that was so unbearable that it resulted in 
even more violence? Or was it simply a maddening release of what we (un)knowingly 
suppress daily? Whatever it may have been, it was not something to turn away from. We 
desperately need to develop stamina for facing both that what we do not want to face, but 
also that what we cannot know that we may encounter. It seems very difficult to resist the 
urge of translating the unknowable into knowable (in a way this text is probably an 
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unexpected may (or not) happen to us.  
If, however, that does happen one day, that we are somehow hit by something that 
profoundly transforms the way we sense ourselves in (relation to) the world, that breaks 
down our imagined separability, then maybe the thoughts in this text could be of some 
further use. Until then, they are perhaps no more than a reminder that something else has 
always been possible. 
Notes 
1 The character of Elizabeth Costello is used by J.M.Coetzee’s as his alter ego.. 
2 One such pedagogical tool that can help us observe our resistance strategies is the pedagogical metaphor 
of the “bus” that is being developed by the Gesturing towards decolonial futures collective (n.d.). The 
metaphor seeks to destabilize the need for coherence and unity of the self with the purpose of lowering 
defenses that we develop in order to protect our self-image. The collective proposes that by imaging 
ourselves as a bus full of known and unknown passengers, riding on several different decks on the bus, we 
can learn how to observe the behavior of different passengers on our “bus”, without judgment. 
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